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1. INTRODUCTION
China was well known as the most popular destination of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in the past two decades. However, a relatively recent but important 
phenomenon has been China’s aggressive engagement in outward direct invest-
ment (ODI). This growth in ODI has been evident since 2001, when the Chinese 
authorities declared the “Going Global” policy to promote its overseas investment 
activity.1 In 2004, China announced the “Guidelines on Investment Overseas”, that 
introduced her major industrial goals, preferential development industries, and ad-
mittance rules for foreign invested industries, thereby stimulating boomed ODI. 
As shown in Figure 1, the size of China’s ODI remained trivial before the 
early 2000s. In 2003, the amount of ODI was US$2.85 billion and then increased 
sharply from 2004, coinciding with the drastic expansion of China’s current ac-
count surplus (Huang – Wang 2011). By 2008, China’s ODI (US$52 billion) had 
significantly jumped, doubling 2007 flows (US$22 billion). In 2011, China be-
came the largest developing country investor (US$65 billion) with its ODI cap-
turing a global share of 3.48%, thereby ranking sixth in the world following the 
US, Japan, the UK, France, and Hong Kong.
Why do Chinese enterprises undertake ODI so much at an early stage in 
China’s economic development? Does this phenomenon follow a unique model 
that is different from the traditional FDI theory? This intriguing issue has at-
tracted growing attention among economists recently. Earlier studies in this area 
are descriptive in nature, reviewing historical trends, the evolution of govern-
ment policies, and in-depth case studies; only limited studies have used rigorous 
econometric techniques to implement empirical analyses, while they reached in-
consistent results (Buckley et al. 2007; Huang – Wang 2011; Zhang – Daly 2011), 
suggesting the need for further empirical studies.
Although the traditional FDI theory in terms of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
provides a good theoretical foundation for explaining the determinants of China’s 
ODI (Hurst 2011), there are various other potential explanations for China’s ODI. 
Child – Rodrigues (2005) argue that the motivation of China’s ODI is not to ex-
ploit existing competitive advantages, but to redress competitive disadvantages. 
It is because multinational enterprises (MNEs) from developing countries might 
have different advantages and motivations from those of developed economies. 
1  Buckley et al. (2007) classified China’s ODI policy development into five key stages. Stage 
1: cautious internationalisation between 1979 and 1985; Stage 2: government encouragement 
between 1992 and 1998; Stage 3: expansion and regulation was implemented between 1992 
and 1998; Stage 4: implementation of the “Going Global” policy was enacted between1999 
and 2001; Stage 5: undertaken during the post-WTO period. 
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This might explain why Chinese ODI in Australia and Africa has been a cause 
of serious concern to local governments (Drysdale 2011; Song 2011). China’s 
ODI could also be motivated by the desire to upgrade the industrial technological 
ladder through acquiring advanced technologies, better management skills, and 
stable supplies of raw materials. 
We first briefly introduce the structure and dynamics of China’s ODI, and then 
propose the hypotheses of technology sourcing, resource seeking, and political link-
age. The influences of the technological capabilities and resource abundance of host 
countries in attracting Chinese investments are examined. In particular, the study ex-
amines the role of the political situation in the recipient countries on influencing Chi-
na’s ODI. Examining the determinants of China’s ODI based on the mainstream FDI 
theory of eclectic paradigm (Dunning 2000, 2001) enables the testing of the robust-
ness of Dunning’s paradigm for China’s ODI during the post-WTO accession period. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
literature regarding determinants of ODI, with its main focus on China. Section 
3 briefly introduces the stylized facts of China’s ODI and then establishes three 
testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical models and introduces the 
dataset utilised in this study. Section 5 reports and discusses various empirical 
results. The concluding remarks are summarised in the final section.
Figure 1. China’s outward foreign direct investment
Source: UNCTAD.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The long-standing question of why firms undertake ODI can be traced back to 
the seminal thesis of Hymer (1960), which contends that firms engaging in ODI 
possess and exploit their specific monopolistic advantages, enabling them to ex-
pand their international production capabilities. These monopolistic advantages 
include technological capability, firm scale, product differentiation, and so on. 
Consequently, Kojima (1973) and Ozawa (1979) proposed an alternative perspec-
tive, arguing that ODI is driven by the worsening of macroeconomic conditions 
(e.g. labour cost, exchange rate, and stringent environmental regulation). Along 
with the rapid ODI growth of Asian developing countries in the early 1990s, 
Dunning (2000) proposed the eclectic paradigm that emphasised the influence of 
both asset exploitation and cost push on deriving ODI for MNEs in developing 
countries.2 
Owing to China’s rapid ODI growth, some studies have begun to empirically 
examine the determinants of China’s ODI. Based on the aggregate ODI of 49 
countries between 1984 and 2001, Buckley et al. (2007) concluded that Chinese 
ODI is associated with high levels of political risk and cultural proximity to host 
countries as well as to host market size, geographic proximity, and natural re-
source endowments. 
A growing number of studies use the aggregate data to revisit this issue. 
Cheung – Qian (2009) and Hurst (2011) investigated the potential difference in 
the determinants of China’s ODI between developing and developed countries 
using the total ODI and the ODI of state-owned enterprises (SOE), respectively. 
They indicated that Dunning’s eclectic paradigm provides an excellent theoretical 
framework wherein, (1) both market-seeking and resource-seeking motives drive 
China’s ODI and (2) Chinese exports to developing countries induce China’s 
ODI. However, substantial evidence to prove that China invests in African and 
oil-producing countries mainly for their natural resources was not found. Biggeri 
– Sanfilippo (2009) examined the determinants of China’s ODI in African coun-
tries and found that it was driven by the strategic intersection of three channels 
(FDI, trade, and economic cooperation) as well as by pull factors, particularly the 
natural resource endowments of the receiving countries.
Zhang – Daly (2011) quantified the main drivers of China’s ODI for the 
2003–2009 period. These results were consistent with traditional FDI theory 
where bilateral trade, market size, GDP growth, openness, and resource endow-
ment had a considerable influence. However, using a dataset for the same pe-
2  There are several comprehensive reviews on the determinants of FDI such as Blonigen (2005) 
and Bellak et al. (2008).
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riod, Huang – Wang (2011) found that traditional variables such as market size, 
production cost, and legal environment did not impact Chinese investors’ choice 
of location for ODI. They argue that the main purpose of China’s ODI model 
was not to expand production overseas, but to strengthen industries at home. 
Kolstad – Wiig (2012) focused on institutional and natural resource-related de-
terminants and their interaction. Econometric analyses show that Chinese ODI 
is attracted to large markets and countries with a combination of large natural 
resource endowments and poor institutions. In particular, the interaction effect is 
seen in non-OECD countries.3 
Drawing from the above discussions, the influence of technology sourcing and 
institutional environment on China’s ODI is not well examined and has reached 
mixed results. Moreover, despite the resource seeking hypothesis being widely 
recognised as one of the main drivers of Chinese investments, the question of 
how the institutional environment of recipient countries affects China’s ODI is 
rarely examined. 
3.  CHINA’S ODI AND HYPOTHESES  
3.1 China’s ODI
Some studies such as Buckley et al. (2007), Huang-Wang (2011), and Hurst 
(2011) have observed the structure and dynamics of China’s ODI and summa-
rised three distinct features. First, there is a large share of ODI conducted by 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). They accounted for 43% of total ODI in 2003, 
while this share decreased to 11.1% by 2011 gradually (NBS, 2012) and the share 
of ODI undertaken by private firms increased sharply. However, SOEs continue 
to play a dominant role in China’s ODI in terms of accumulated capital. By the 
end of 2011, China’s ODI investments by SOEs reached an extremely high share 
(62.7%) of the total ODI stock.
SOEs that are administered by the central or local governments generally en-
joy privileges such as government-supported subsidies, loans, procurements, and 
regulations, implying that they are often tasked to achieve specific strategic goals. 
The political influence in SOE investment decision-making suggests that China’s 
ODI contains strong political motivations, as the approval system allowed the au-
thorities to allocate ODI according to the objectives of the state (Cheung – Qian 
2009). Indeed, China’s extensive foreign exchange reserves provided opportuni-
3  Another emerging line of research focuses on the choice of entry modes or locations by using 
firm-level data, e.g. Cui – Jiang (2009) and Ramasamy et al. (2012).
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ties to acquire discounted assets in crisis periods. This specific ODI phenomenon 
has attracted policy attention and – as already noted – caused problems for Chi-
nese investors in recipient countries.4 
Second, the geographic distribution of China’s ODI remained stable over time, 
where the dominant flows are to its Asia neighbours and Latin America. The 
main Asian destinations are Korea and the member countries of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) such as Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Myanmar. The share of ODI flows to Latin America is so high that 
it exceeds the corresponding number for Asia and accounted for 52.6% and 48% 
in 2005 and 2006, respectively.5 Africa and Europe receive a small share of capi-
tal inflow, but higher than that to North America and Oceania. Moreover, China’s 
ODI targets mainly non-OECD countries, while its share decreased from 94.6% 
in 2008 to 81.8% in 2011 gradually (NBS 2012). In contrast, OECD countries 
received more investment from China recently.
Africa ranked third or fourth in China’s ODI destinations before 2008, while it 
became the second largest recipient region, accounting for 9.8% of China’s total 
ODI in 2008. Nigeria, South Africa, South Sudan, Algeria, and Zambia are the 
main host countries of China’s ODI in Africa. Crucially, China has undertaken 
more ODI in Africa relative to other countries with an accumulated stock of in-
vestment amounting to more than US $8 billion (Song et al. 2011).6 Aiming to se-
cure its access to critical raw materials is one of the possible reasons for increased 
investments in Africa because the Chinese government has recognised strategic 
ODI as a necessary tool for sustaining further growth. In the existing FDI litera-
ture, the resource-seeking hypothesis is a long-standing issue and seems particu-
larly relevant to China’s ODI; however, existing studies do not lead to a consist-
ent conclusion (Cheung – Qian 2009; Biggeri – Sanfilippo 2009). 
Actually, African countries are relatively restrictive to foreign investment and 
have a non-democratic political system with corruption issues. FDI literature sug-
gests a negative impact of corruption on FDI (Habib – Zurawicki 2002; Egger – 
Winner 2006). Still, this type of investment environment involving the execution 
4  For example, Chinese overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in Australia, which target 
the resource sector, has raised the question of whether investments by China require special 
scrutiny (Drysdale 2011).
5  However, much of the investment in Latin America was made in two tax havens there: Cay-
man Islands and British Virgin Islands.
6  If we exclude the specific role of ODI to Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and the British 
Virgin Islands, the shares shown in parentheses suggest that Asia and Europe rank as the top 
two destinations. The ODI share toward Africa increases sharply, highlighting the special role 
of Africa.  
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of political power and provisioning of financial incentives can have a positive ef-
fect on market attractiveness for China to damage these countries of their natural 
resources and raw materials. The impact of this institutional factor on China’s 
ODI may differ from that of the developed countries.
Upgrading the technological ladder has been the primary goal of industrial 
policy in China. Thus, the authorities may direct Chinese MNEs to obtain foreign 
technologies, to upgrade the domestic technological ladder. As the capital out-
flow to OECD countries has been gradually increasing, one of the reasons why 
Chinese MNEs undertake ODI to higher wage countries is to redress competitive 
disadvantages (Child – Rodrigues 2005), implying that the motivation of technol-
ogy sourcing might be the driver.
Third, the sectoral distribution of China’s ODI is diversified rather than con-
centrated, although China enjoys comparative advantages in information and 
communications technology (ICT) industries under the global production chain 
since the early 2000s. However, the mining sector is one of the targeted indus-
tries China invested in, which accounted for almost one-half and one-third in 
2003 and 2004, respectively. In 2006, this number stood at 48.4%. Surprisingly, 
China’s ODI in the manufacturing sector dropped from 21.9% in 2003 to 9.4% 
in 2011 (NBS 2012). The sectoral distribution seems to differentiate China’s 
ODI behaviour from that of developed countries and its Asian neighbours such 
as Korea and Taiwan.
3.2 Hypotheses establishment
3.2.1 Technology sourcing
Why does China, a developing country, undertake ODI in developed countries? 
The possible goal is to acquire advanced technologies by establishing foreign 
affiliates in developed countries. This prospective technological spillover may 
induce technology sourcing ODI as firms seek to upgrade their technology. In 
practice, this behaviour applies to both technologically advanced and technologi-
cally lagging firms (Neven – Siotis 1996; Bjorvatn – Eckel 2006).
Technological acquisition is influenced by a variety of institutional factors such 
as access to R&D personnel; access to external sources of knowledge; the po-
litical, legal, and administrative environment; and the organisation of knowledge 
transfer (Hemmert 2004). Access to advanced technologies through ODI pro-
vides a more aggressive and effective approach to China’s technological catch-up 
(Amighini et al. 2010). This aggressive ODI strategy of technology sourcing can 
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be effective in achieving the goal of promoting domestic technological capability, 
while China’s ODI toward OECD countries is moderate. 
Hypothesis 1: Technology sourcing. China’s ODI is associated positively with 
the technological capability of host countries, especially for advanced countries.
3.2.2 Resource seeking
China has become one of the largest resource importing countries. Gaining se-
curity over access to raw materials is often cited as a reason for Chinese firms to 
invest overseas (Buckley et al. 2007; Biggeri – Sanfilippo 2009; Kolstad – Wiig 
2012). This strategy can also be witnessed in the aforementioned discussion that 
mining accounts for the largest ODI flow in the past couple of years. It suggests 
that the motivation of resource seeking, aimed at securing a long-term supply of 
resources, plays a crucial role in China’s ODI. 
China’s ODI toward Australia is a good example of resource seeking. Accord-
ing to the “Annual Report 2009–10” released by the Foreign Investment Review 
Board (FIRB) in January 2011,7 China was Australia’s third largest investor in 2009–
2010, with a total proposed investment of US$16.3 billion. The majority of this 
investment was in the mineral exploration and development sector, accounting for 
US$12.2 billion and representing 75% of the total proposed investment. China’s 
investment in Africa is another example of resource seeking; a New York Times 
(2007) report explored China’s deepening economic and political ties with Africa. 
“We are back where we started, sending raw materials out, and bringing cheap 
manufactured goods in. This isn’t progress. It is colonialism,” Wilfred Collins Wo-
nani, leader of the Chamber of Commerce in Zambia told The New York Times. 
Even though China is well endowed with its own natural resources, its per 
capita availability of resources such as timber, iron ore, aluminium, copper, and 
petroleum is very low. China’s overseas expansion has also been driven by the 
need to secure access to raw materials and natural resources.  
Hypothesis 2: Resource seeking. China’s ODI is positively associated with 
natural resource endowments of host countries.
3.2.3 Political linkage
The FDI theory predicts a negative association of how corruption and political 
risks of recipient countries affect FDI inflow because market-oriented firms may 
7 http://www.firb.gov.au/content/publications.asp
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substitute FDI behaviour by exporting or licensing (Habib – Zurawicki 2002; 
Egger – Winner 2006). Buckley – Casson (1999) argue that resource-oriented 
firms are also discouraged from committing to substantial costs in the form of 
FDI projects. Although inefficient institutions in terms of corruption and political 
risks are deterrents of FDI inflow to Africa (Wei 2000; Asiedu 2006), Egger – 
Winner (2005) claimed that corruption can be an incentive for FDI development, 
especially toward less developed countries.  
Indeed, recent theoretical works propose alternative views. Field Jr. et al. 
(2003) assume that corruption takes place because foreign firms try to reduce 
their settlement fixed costs and obtain illegal preferential tax treatment from 
corrupt host government officials. The negotiation process between firms and 
corrupt officials leads to an inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption 
and FDI. Kendell – Zhou (2008) studied the possible effects of corruption on a 
MNE’s choice between FDI and exporting when it faces competition from a local 
firm. Analyses drawn from a game theory model showed that discriminatory cor-
ruption can encourage a foreign firm to switch from exporting to FDI. 
As mentioned previously, China’s ODI prefers to invest in countries with a 
political environment of autocratic regimes, higher corruption levels, and/or high 
political risk such as African and South American countries and the ODI is most-
ly undertaken by SOEs. China has become an increasingly important investor, 
while it might also want to be the leading power of the developing countries in a 
coveted multipolar world. In its ODI to Africa and Latin America, China not only 
meets its demand for energy and raw material, but also significantly contributes 
to the economic growth of these areas because the “Chinese package” contains 
the variety of concession contracts, the development of local infrastructure, pref-
erential loans, agreements on debt remission, aids, and preferential conditions 
to improve the developing country’s export potential. At the same time, China 
builds its own sphere of influence, where it can decide – based on its own eco-
nomic and political interests. Therefore, ODI helps China to establish a good 
political relationship with those countries, probably through bribing in countries 
with a high level of corruption. From the political perspective, this type of ODI 
also helps to cement bilateral political relationships. This deviation from standard 
FDI theory thus inspires the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Political linkage. China’s ODI is positively associated with the 
political risks of host countries.
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4. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DATA
4.1 Empirical specifi cation
To examine the determinants of China’s ODI, with a focus on testing the proposed 
hypotheses, this study adopts the gravity-type model of the eclectic paradigm 
because this model still remains a powerful and robust framework for examin-
ing contextual specific theories of FDI (Dunning 2001). By indexing China as 
the source country to examine ODI from the Chinese perspective, the empirical 
model is specified as
  (1)
where  represents (i) China’s ODI to country j in year t. It is measured by the total 
amount of ODI to individual host countries.8  
As for the inclusion of explanatory variables, we refer to the eclectic paradigm 
of FDI theory to consider asset exploiting, cost push, distance, and other factors. 
Variables of technology sourcing, resource seeking, and political linkage are the 
main concerns that might increase ODI flow. Term GDP is the host country’s 
gross domestic product, representing the market size and capturing the effect 
of market seeking. Market size directly affects the potential profits obtained by 
undertaking ODI, thus implying potentially larger and more promising prospects. 
Consequently, FDI tends to flow to countries with a larger market size. The mar-
ket-seeking motive has been shown to positively relate to ODI (Dunning 2000), 
we thus expect a positive coefficient. 
Previous studies, e.g., Grosse – Trevino (1996) and Zheng (2009), have sug-
gested that trade has a strong relation with the amount of a country’s ODI, and we 
thus include the trade variable of China’s exports (EXP) to destination countries. 
Firms prefer to invest in trade markets they are more familiar with, and high trade 
volumes might indicate a high economic integration between the countries. Be-
cause export and FDI behaviours are generally viewed as complementary rather 
than substitutive (Grosse – Trevino 1996), the estimated coefficient for exports 
is expected to be significantly positive. Moreover, Chakrabarti (2001) and Buck-
ley et al. (2007) suggest that ODI is positively associated with indicators of the 
“openness” of the economy because FDI is stimulated if the trade regime of the 
host economy is more liberal. Hence, we include the openness variable (OPEN), 
8  We excluded ODI in the service sector in this study. However, the Chinese ODI statistics do 
not separate investments across sectors in most host countries. The limitation might induce an 
underestimation of the influences of the proposed hypotheses. 
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which is measured by the ratio of inward FDI stock to the host country’s GDP, 
and predict a positive impact on attracting investments.
The term INFjt denotes the inflation rate of country j in year t, acting as a proxy 
of macroeconomic stability. Higher inflation rates in a host country will deter 
FDI because it not only reduces the book value of capital inflow, but also in-
creases the uncertainty of long-term decision making. This is because the volatile 
and unexpected inflation rate is generally caused by worsening macroeconomic 
conditions. DIS denotes the geographic distance between China and its invest-
ing countries. The greater the distance, the higher the transaction cost, naturally 
decreasing the amount of FDI (Buckley – Casson 1981). 
To test Hypothesis 1 that China’s ODI may aim to access the advanced technol-
ogies of host countries, we adopt two alternative measures for the TECH variable. 
Firstly, is using the number of total European patents granted by the European 
Patent Office (EPO) (PEPO) adequate for measuring a country’s technological 
capability? Because EPO patents can be treated as “new to the world” innova-
tions, it is an adequate indication of innovation performance. However, using 
patent statistics, either domestic or foreign patents, as an innovation indicator has 
some drawbacks (Nagaoka et al. 2010). When investing in advanced economies, 
Chinese firms are primarily motivated by the quest for strategic resources and 
capabilities, and the underlying rationale for such asset-seeking FDI is strate-
gic needs. These assets include globally established brands, technological know-
how, and R&D capacity. Thus, we alternatively adopt the degree of human capital 
(HUM) as the indicator of a country’s technological capability. As the quantity of 
higher education is one of the widely adopted measures (Barro 2001), we adopt 
the enrollment ratio of higher education as the indicator. As predicted in Hypoth-
esis 1, the estimated coefficient of the TECH variable should be positive. 
The term RES denotes the ratio of raw material imported from country j, in-
cluding agricultural products, fuel, ores, and metals. This variable is used to test 
Hypothesis 2, which states that one of China’s primary ODI goals is resource 
seeking. The resource-seeking motive is to ensure a stable supply of certain 
resources that the home country has a shortage of, or those that are expen-
sive in the home country. Recent studies, for example Buckley et al. (2007), 
Biggeri – Sanfilippo (2009), and Kolstad – Wiig (2012), found that ensuring the 
sufficiency of raw materials is one of the main reasons for China’s ODI, in order 
to meet the growing requirement for raw materials and natural resources to sus-
tain China’s growth. Even though China is well endowed with abundant natural 
resources such as timber, iron ore, aluminium, copper, and petroleum, its per 
capita availability is very low. Therefore, resource seeking remains a critical fac-
tor for spurring China’s ODI.
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To test the political-linkage hypothesis, two institutional variables are includ-
ed. The term PR refers to the political right index, which is surveyed by Freedom 
House. It ranges from 1 to 7, with a higher value indicating a lower level of po-
litical freedom. Even though democratic countries are generally more attractive 
in terms of capital inflow (Harms – Ursprung 2002) and corruption seemingly 
deters FDI as it represents an extra tax (Brouthers et al. 2008), this situation may 
not apply to the case of China’s ODI9 because its level of corruption remains 
high.10 China is an economic superpower and wants to be the opinion leader of 
the developing world. Centralist/corrupt countries are generally not the favoured 
investment destinations of Western countries. However, due to economic and 
political interests as discussed previously, China might try to establish good po-
litical relations with those centralist nations through ODI. Therefore, this study 
expects a significantly positive coefficient for the PR variable. 
As is common in the specification of the panel data model, we allow the ex-
istence of individual effects that are potentially correlated with the right-hand 
side regressors. Using a “within firm” panel estimator (fixed effect (FE) or RE 
technique) to eliminate the individual effect is a standard estimation method. Be-
cause the variable of distance is time invariant that will be eliminated from the FE 
model, this study adopts the RE model to implement the empirical estimations.
4.2 Data source
The dataset used in this study is the yearly investment data from China and its 111 
major destinations from 2003 to 2009. The sample set is representative, because 
the ODI toward these countries accounts for more than 90% of China’s capital 
outflow during the sample period. Moreover, we separate the sample into two 
subsamples of OECD and non-OECD countries. The groups of developed and 
developing countries contain 30 and 81 countries, respectively.11 
Data on the annual flow of China’s ODI was obtained from various issues of 
the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Other vari-
ables were mainly drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
and various other sources. Table 1 summarises the definition, basis statistics, and 
data sources of variables.
 9  Some studies find a negative relation between democracy and capital inflow, e.g. Resnick 
(2001) and Resnick – Li (2003).
10  For example, China’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) score was 3.5 in 2010, ranking 78 
out of 178 countries (Transparency Internationals, http://www.transparency.org)
11  Due to the specific role of ODI to Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin 
Islands, they are not included in this analysis.
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Main results
Table 2 presents a series of estimations and serves as the baseline models. Esti-
mates in models (1) – (3) are obtained by including the corresponding variable of 
tested hypotheses (1) – (3), whereas model (4) includes three tested variables.
Table 1
Variable definition, basic statistics, and sources
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Error
Source
lnODI China’s outward investment to 
country j (US$)
1.305 2.167 Statistical Bulletin of 
China’s Outward FDI
lnGDP Market size: measured by the 
host country’s GDP (US$)
10.582 1.999 World Bank Development 
Indicator 
lnEXP China’s exports to the host 
country (US$)
6.459 2.364 China Statistical Yearbook
OPEN Ratio of inward FDI stock to 
host GDP
4.787 6.465 World Bank Development 
Indicator
INF Annual inflation rate of the host 
country (%)
7.008 7.837 World Bank Development 
Indicator
lnDIS Distance between China and the 
host country (km)
3.058 1.001 CEPII-Centre d’Etudes Pro-
spectives et d’Informations 
Internationales
PEPO The total European granted pat-
ent by the EPO
7.103 15.247 European Patent Office
HUM The enrolment of tertiary edu-
cation (%)
43.992 24.964 World Bank Development 
Indicator
RES The ratio of raw material export 
including agricultural products, 
fuel, ores and metals (%)
30.539 30.497 World Bank Development 
Indicator
ORES The ratio of ores and metals 
exports to total merchandise 
exports of the host country (%)
8.681 16.942 World Bank Development 
Indicator
PR Political rights: 1 to 7 (1 a high 
level of political freedom in the 
host country)
3.023 1.997 Freedom House
CL Civil liberties: 1 to 7 (1 a high 
level of civil liberties in the 
host country)
2.925 1.595 Freedom House
Note: The mean and standard errors are calculated by pooling data for the 2003–2009 periods.
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By observing the estimates in models (1) – (5), the overall results support ar-
guments in the traditional FDI theory of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. The host 
country’s market size (GDP), China’s exports to a destination (EXP), and the 
openness variable (OPEN) are associated with a significantly positive coefficient. 
This suggests that the market size of host countries is a stimulus to attract China’s 
ODI. Furthermore, China invests in countries that are more open and/or have a 
closer trade relation with China. These results are consistent with the previous 
findings by Buckley et al. (2007), Zheng, (2009), and Zhang – Daly (2011).
As argued in Hypothesis 1, China’s ODI should be motivated by technology 
sourcing. However, the estimated coefficient of the technology sourcing vari-
able (EPTO) is positive, but not statistically significant in models (1) and (4), 
whereby it does not support the hypothesis of technology sourcing. It is possible 
that technology embodied in FDI is one of the primary external sources for ac-
Table 2
Determinants of China’s ODI
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Constant
lnGDP
 
lnEXP
OPEN
INF
lnDIS
PEPO
HUM
RES
PR
–2.839***
(0.902)
0.404***
(0.076)
0.048*
(0.027)
0.020**
(0.0096)
–2.70E-05
(0.008)
-0.180
(0.130)
2.81E-05
(7.03E-05)
–3.145***
(0.815)
0.562***
(0.085)
0.083*
(0.046)
0.023**
(0.011)
–0.004
(0.009)
–0.004
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.004)
–3.994***
(1.004)
0.559***
(0.089)
0.075
(0.046)
0.022**
(0.011)
–0.002
(0.009)
–0.003
(0.003)
0.198***
(0.070)
–4.085***
(0.911)
0.436***
(0.073)
0.050*
(0.027)
0.021**
(0.0010)
–0.002
(0.008)
–0.198
(0.123)
8.62E-05
(6.72E-05)
0.011***
(0.004)
0.194***
(0.061)
–4.305***
(1.154)
0.379***
(0.092)
0.045
(0.033)
0.031*
(0.018)
0.001
(0.011)
–0.292*
(0.160)
0.017**
(0.007)
0.014***
(0.005)
0.265***
(0.074)
Observation 777 777 777 777 490
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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quiring technologies. When we adopt the quality of human capital as the indicator 
of technological level, estimates in model (5) show that the coefficient of HUM 
is significantly positive at the 5% statistical level.12 It implies that China tends 
to invest in countries with superior technological capabilities, ceteris paribus, 
supporting thereby Hhypothesis 1. One point worth noting is that if the motive of 
technology sourcing is crucial, China’s ODI should be geared toward developed 
countries because their technological capacity is much higher than that of China. 
For Hypothesis 2 of resource seeking, the estimated coefficient RES is sig-
nificantly positive at the 1% level in columns (2), (4), and (5). It yields evidence 
supporting that China’s ODI may aim to ensure the security of sufficient natural 
resources. This finding is not only consistent with most previous studies (Buckley 
et al. 2007; Biggeri – Sanfilippo 2009; Kolstad – Wiig 2012), but also echoes the 
serious concerns of many resource-abundant countries that China’s ODI is prob-
ably motivated by the goal of plundering the natural resources of host countries.
Regarding the test of Hypothesis 3 (political linkage), the PR variable is a sig-
nificantly positive coefficient in models (3) – (5). It indicates that countries with a 
low level of political freedom attract more capital inflow from China, supporting 
thereby the political linkage hypothesis. 
Why does China’s ODI behaviour contradict the FDI theory? In general, 
market-oriented firms may substitute FDI by exporting to or licensing in high 
political risk countries to secure their property rights (Habib – Zurawicki 2002; 
Egger – Winner 2006). The developing countries considered risky by Western 
or developed countries do not appear as such to China and are not an obstacle 
because, on the one hand, it may consider those destinations less risky, while on 
the other hand, China’s ODI favouring destinations with low political freedom, 
ceteris paribus, is likely to be driven by non-economic purpose. As mentioned 
previously, the political linkage through ODI helps China to be the mouthpiece 
of the developing world. Our finding echoes Eggers – Winner’s (2005) argument 
that corruption could be an incentive for FDI.
Previous studies, e.g. Cheung – Qian (2009) and Hurst (2011), claim that 
the determinants of China’s ODI may vary between developed and developing 
countries. It implies that the effectiveness of the hypotheses may depend on the 
development degree of host countries because the levels of technological capa-
bility, political freedom, and resource endowment differ considerably between 
developed and developing countries. To examine the roles of technology sourc-
ing, resource seeking, and political linkage on China’s ODI in developed and 
developing countries, we include two dummy variables, non-OECD and OECD, 
12  The information regarding the enrolment rate of tertiary education is available for only 70 
countries, calling for the reduction of the number of observations to 490. 
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Table 3
Determinants of China’s ODI – further investigation
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
TECH = HUM TECH = PEPO
Constant
lnGDP
lnEXP
OPEN
INF
lnDIS
TECH
RES
PR
TECH *NON-OECD
TECH *OECD
RES*NON-OECD
RES*OECD
PR*NON-OECD
PR*OECD
TECH*D08
RES*D08
PR*D08
–4.734***
(1.180)
0.462***
(0.103)
0.045
(0.033)
0.029
(0.018)
0.0004
(0.011)
–0.318*
(0.163)
0.017**
(0.008)
0.018*
(0.010)
0.013***
(0.005)
0.021
(0.014)
0.224***
(0.085)
–0.507
(0.432)
–3.941***
(1.164)
0.432***
(0.093)
–0.046
(0.036)
0.023
(0.019)
0.007
(0.012)
–0.276*
(0..162)
0.006
(0.007)
0.021***
(0.006)
0.136*
(0.080)
0.012***
(0.004)
–0.007
(0.005)
0.189***
(0.061)
–3.925***
(0.970)
0.433***
(0.090)
0.049*
(0.027)
0.020**
(0.010)
–0.003
(0.008)
–0.185
(0.125)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.001***
(0.0001)
0.009***
(0.004)
0.028**
(0.012)
0.168**
(0.066)
–0.499
(0.362)
–3.477***
(0.925)
0.428***
(0.074)
–0.034
(0.029))
0.021**
(0.010))
0.005
(0.008)
–0.196
(0.125)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.015***
(0.004)
0.058
(0.065)
0.0001**
(0.0001)
–0.003
(0.004)
0.290***
(0.046)
Observation 490 490 777 777
Note: See Table 2. 
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to separate these two groups. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms 
between the concerned variables and country group enable us to distinguish the 
possible differences. Table 3 presents a series of estimations.
Table 3 shows that the estimates are overall similar to those in Table 2, and 
we focus analysing the proposed hypotheses. Surprisingly, both coefficients of 
TECH*non-OECD and TECH*OECD are significantly positive, using either hu-
man capital or European patents as the proxy of technological capability. It indi-
cates that China’s ODI is positively associated with the technological capabilities 
of the host countries. In contrast with our expectations, this effect of technology 
sourcing from non-OECD countries is not lower than that from OECD countries. 
Two interesting findings worth mentioning are the tests on Hypotheses 2 and 
3. As shown in model (1), the interaction term between resource and country 
group is significantly positive only for RES*non-OECD rather than RES*OECD. 
Estimates in model (3) also suggest that the magnitude of the resource-seeking 
effect is much higher for non-OECD countries. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 of re-
source seeking is strongly supported for destinations of non-OECD countries. 
Similarly, the PR*non-OECD variable is associated with a significantly positive 
coefficient in models (1) and (3), whereas the coefficient of PR*OECD is insig-
nificantly negative. OECD countries have democratic systems and a high degree 
of political freedom, which prevents the feasibility of dollar diplomacy through 
ODI. Thus, the hypothesis of political linkage does not hold in OECD countries. 
Alternatively, the political linkage hypothesis is strongly supported for China’s 
ODI toward non-OECD countries, implying that in poorer countries, it is easier to 
bribe government officials in order to implement investment projects. 
An observed phenomenon from Figure 1 is that China invested more aggres-
sively during the global financial crisis as the recession made it much easier to 
acquire foreign assets and technologies. To verify this conjecture, we include a 
dummy year (D08) for the global crisis period of 2008–2010 and then analyse its 
interactive effect with TECH, RES, and PR. As shown in models (2) and (4) of 
Table 3, the motive of technology sourcing is witnessed for the crisis period. The 
RES variable maintains its significance; however, its interaction with RES*D08 
is insignificant. Crucially, the PR variable is significant and accompanies a sig-
nificantly positive sign for the interaction term PR*D08. This lends evidence that 
since the global financial crisis, China’s preference has been to allocate ODI in 
countries with a political environment of autocratic regimes. 
As the behaviour of favouring ODI in high risk countries, especially for non-
OECD countries, contradicts the FDI theories, the study explains the specific 
behaviour from the perspective of political linkage hypothesis. Lying beneath 
the surface of political motivation, ODI should be mainly driven by economic 
forces, implying that the political factor is used as a tool to exploit the economic 
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benefits. To examine this argument, we further estimate the interaction between 
the PR and technology sourcing as well as the PR and resource seeking variables. 
Table 4 reports the results.
Estimates in model (1) show that the interaction terms PR*TECH and PR*RES 
are significantly positive, indicating that the political factor plays a crucial role in 
both technology sourcing and resource seeking. That is, countries with a higher 
technological capability or abundant resources, but with a higher political risk 
seem to be favoured destinations for China’s ODI. However, the interaction effect 
between political linkage and technology sourcing seems to be less supported, as 
shown in model (4). 
The political environment of developed countries is generally a democratic 
regime, leaving less room for political power to affect FDI. Thus, if the politi-
cal factor matters to technology sourcing and resource-seeking motivations, it 
Table 4
The role of institutional factors on resource seeking and technology sourcing
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
TECH = HUM TECH = PEPO
Constant
lnGDP
lnEXP
OPEN
INF
lnDIS
PR*TECH
PR*RES
PR*TECH*OECD
PR*TECH*NON-OECD
PR*RES*OECD
PR*RES*NON-OECD
–3.513***
(1.087)
0.408***
(0.082)
0.044
(0.033)
0.035*
(0.018)
0.001
(0.011)
–0.289*
(0.161)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.0007)
–3.534***
(1.184)
0.411***
(0.101)
0.043
(0.033)
0.035*
(0.018)
0.001
(0.011)
–0.289*
(0.163)
0.002***
(0.0007)
0.005
(0.006)
0.005***
(0.001)
–3.220***
(1.136)
0.383***
(0.087)
0.042
(0.033)
0.035*
(0.018)
0.001
(0.011)
–0.323*
(0.166)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.014
(0.012)
0.002***
(0.0007)
–3.017***
(0.878)
0.398***
(0.074)
0.051*
(0.027)
0.020**
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.008)
–0.184
(0.125)
6.18E-05
(6.82E-05)
0.002***
(0.0006)
–2.533***
(0.856)
0.327***
(0.073)
0.049*
(0.027)
0.018*
(0.009)
–0.001
(0.008)
–0.129
(0.122)
0.002***
(0.0006)
0.0001
(6.69E-05)
0.009***
(0.002)
–3.049***
(0.933)
0.402***
(0.079)
0.051*
(0.027)
0.020**
(0.009)
–0.001
(0.008)
–0.183
(0.127)
6.01E-05
(6.90E-05)
0.001
(0.011)
0.002***
(0.0006)
Observations 490 490 490 777 777 777
Notes: See Table 2. 
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should apply to China’s ODI in developing countries. The above conjecture is 
verified by the estimates in models (2), (3), (5), and (6) that the interaction terms 
PR*TECH and PR*RES are significantly positive only for non-OECD countries. 
5.2 Robustness check
As one distinct feature differentiating this paper from existing literature is the 
political linkage hypothesis, we adopt an alternative institutional variable to con-
duct empirical estimations to obtain robust results. The civil rights index (CL), 
surveyed by Freedom House, serves as an adequate proxy. This index measures 
the degree of civil liberties and it ranges between 1 and 7. A higher value of CL 
denotes a lower level of civil rights. Thus, the estimated coefficient on the CL 
variable should be positive if Hypothesis 3 – that China tends to invest in high 
risk (low civic rights) countries due to the political linkage reasons – is supported. 
A series of these estimates are summarised in Table 5.
Table 5
Determinants of China’s ODI – Robustness Check
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Constant –4.265*** (1.176) –4.707*** (1.196) –3.890*** (1.194)
lnGDP 0.369*** (0.092) 0.450*** (0.102) 0.426*** (0.094)
lnEXP 0.042 (0.033) 0.043 (0.033) –0.051 (0.036)
OPEN 0.035* (0.018) 0.032* (0.018) 0.026 (0.019)
INF 0.001 (0.011) –0.001 (0.011) 0.007 (0.012)
lnDIS –0.298* (0.160) –0.336** (0.163) –0.282* (0.163)
EDU 0.018*** (0.007) 0.007 (0.007)
RES 0.015*** (0.005) 0.022*** (0.006)
CL 0.286*** (0.097) 0.139 (0.103)
HUM*NON-OECD 0.020*** (0.008)
HUM*OECD 0.015 (0.010)
RES*NON-OECD 0.013*** (0.005)
RES*OECD 0.021 (0.014)
CL*NON-OECD 0.243** (0.117)
CL*OECD –0.146 (0.285)
HUM *D08 0.011*** (0.004)
RES*D08 –0.008 (0.005)
CL*D08 0.245*** (0.071)
Observations 490 490 490
Notes See Table 2. 
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The coefficients of GDP and OPEN remain significantly positive, whereas 
DIS associates with a significantly negative coefficient,13 suggesting thereby that 
China’s ODI behaviour is consistent with the traditional FDI theory. Although the 
estimates obtained in the three models are very similar, there are some interesting 
findings worth addressing. 
First, the technology sourcing hypothesis is overall supported, while this pur-
pose seems to be relevant to destinations of non-OECD countries and for the 
post-global financial tsunami period. The deregulation of the domestic market 
to attract inward FDI with the desired technologies is an alternative for China to 
upgrade its technological ladder. It is the possible reason for why the technology 
sourcing hypothesis is not strongly supported for the OECD countries.
Second, drawing from estimates in Table 5, the hypothesis of political link-
age is again confirmed. Crucially, the influences of political factors on China’s 
ODI are also particularly relevant to non-OECD countries and the post-global 
financial tsunami period, as both variables of CL*NON-OECD and CL*D08 are 
associated with a significantly positive coefficient. The predictions of FDI theo-
ries in Habib – Zurawicki (2002) and Egger – Winner (2006) suggest that there 
is a negative association between FDI and political risk. However, our findings 
support the hypothesis of political linkage that China tends to invest in high risk 
countries, after controlling other factors. In fact, the non-democratic political sys-
tem may create room for China to easily undertake desired investment projects 
in less-developed countries. As the coefficient of CL*OECD (and PR*OCED in 
Table 6) is insignificantly negative, our findings tend to support the theoretical 
prediction in Field Jr. et al. (2003), which states that the relationship between cor-
ruption and FDI is probably an inverted U-shape. 
6. CONCLUSION
The expansion in Chinese outward (ODI) direct investment in the recent past 
raises the interesting and important question of what determines China’s ODI. It 
questions whether the traditional FDI theory applies to China. However, China’s 
upsurge in investments is suspected to have specific purposes other than being 
economically driven. This study examines the determinants of China’s ODI by 
proposing three testable hypotheses, including technology sourcing, resource 
seeking, and political linkage.
13  We adopt also PEPO as the indicator of technological capability to implement empirical esti-
mations. The results are similar, while EXP and DIS turns to significantly positive and insig-
nificant negative, respectively. To save space, the results are not reported here. 
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Various estimates show that the traditional FDI theory overall applies to Chi-
na’s ODI behaviour. Market size, trade, openness, and distance have a significant 
influence on ODI with an expected sign. Our results and comparisons with previ-
ous studies also suggest that China’s ODI outflow exhibits some distinct features. 
To promote its technological capability, China’s ODI is attracted by countries 
with higher technological levels, which tends to support the technology sourcing 
hypothesis. The widely believed notion that China’s ODI favours countries rich 
in natural resources in order to secure sufficient resources to support long-term 
growth is witnessed in this study. After controlling other variables and using vari-
ous measures of resources, we find that China’s ODI is strongly related to the 
resource variable in both OECD and non-OECD countries, thus validating the 
resource-seeking hypothesis.
In particular, this study proposes the political linkage hypothesis to examine 
the specific feature of China’s preference on ODI toward countries with high po-
litical instability, ceteris paribus. Various estimates confirm this hypothesis and 
it is particularly relevant to non-OECD countries. This finding is in contrast with 
the prediction of the FDI theory. This specific investment behaviour reflects the 
background characteristics of China’s ODI, in particular the predominant state 
ownership of MNEs and the institutional context of China. 
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